

Contact Details

Department of Philosophy
 University of Connecticut
 Storrs, CT 06269-1054 USA

Phone: (+1) 860.230.4391
 Email: jcbeall@gmail.com
 Website: entailments.net

Education

University of Massachusetts, Amherst	MA, PhD (Philosophy)	May 1998
Australian National University	Postgraduate studies	1993
Princeton University	Postgraduate studies	1990–92
Princeton Theological Seminary	MDiv (Academic Track)	May 1992
Grove City College (PA, USA)	BA (Philosophy)	May 1989

Career History

Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor, University of Connecticut (Storrs), 2015–
Research Professorship in Philosophy (fractional), University of Tasmania, 2015–
 Professorial Fellow, Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, [2013–15]
 Professor (Philosophy), University of Otago, 2-year appt [2011–13]
 Associate Research Fellow, NIP, University of Aberdeen, [2009–15]
 Professor of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, [2007–2015]
 Associate Professor (Philosophy), University of Connecticut, [2004–2007]
Associate Research Fellow, Arché Centre, University of St Andrews, 2005–
 Visiting Fellow, University of Melbourne, [June 2002]
 Visiting Scholar, Philosophy Subfaculty, Oxford University, [July–Aug 2001]
 Assistant Professor, University of Connecticut, [2000–2003]
 Lecturer B, Victoria University of Wellington, [Jan–July 2000]
 Lecturer A, then Lecturer B, University of Tasmania, [1998–1999]

Awards, Honors

CLAS Research Excellence Award (Humanities Division), University of Connecticut, 2015
 Edward C. Marth Mentorship Award, University of Connecticut, Oct 2013
 British Academy Endorsement: ‘Exceptional Talent’ in Logic and Philosophy, Aug 2013
 Visiting Fellow, Sydney Centre for Foundations of Science, Sydney, Ju-Jul 2012
 Daniel Taylor Fellow, University of Otago, 2009
 Honorary Research Associate, University of Aberdeen, 2009–15
 Visiting Research Fellow, Centre for Foundations of Science, University of Sydney, 2008
 Honorary Research Associate, University of St Andrews, 2005–
 Dean’s Special Merit Award, University of Connecticut, 2004, 2006–7, 2010, 2014
 University Fellow, University of Melbourne, 2003
 UConn Large Grant, University of Connecticut, 2002
 A. Ambrose Lazerowitz/T. Tymoczko Memorial Logic Lecture, Smith College, 2001
 UTas Small Grant, University of Tasmania, 1999
 UMass Teaching Award, University of Massachusetts, 1996
 Purver Fellowship, University of Massachusetts, 1994–95
 Rotary International Scholar’s Grant (ANU), 1993
 Fellowship, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1989–92

Books

MONOGRAPHS

- *Spandrels of Truth*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- *Logical Pluralism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 (with G. Restall).
- *Formal Theories of Truth*, Oxford: OUP, in press (with M. Glanzberg and D. Ripley).
- * *Truth Without Detachment*, to appear with Oxford: OUP, in progress (2016-17).

EDITED COLLECTIONS

- *Revenge of the Liar*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- *Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- *Truth*, special issue of *The Monist*, 2005.
- *The Law of Non-Contradiction*, Oxford: OUP (w/ G. Priest and B. Armour-Garb), 2004.
- *Deflationism and Paradox*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (with B. Armour-Garb), 2006.
- *Deflationary Truth*, Chicago: Open Court Press (with B. Armour-Garb), 2004.

TEXTBOOKS

- *Possibilities and Paradox: An Introduction to Modal and Many-Valued Logic*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (with Bas van Fraassen), 2004.
- *Logic: The Basics*, Oxford: Routledge, 2010.
- *Significantly Revised 2nd Edition of Logic: The Basics*, Oxford: Routledge, in press (2016).
- Supplement to *Logic: The Basics (1st ed.)*, Oxford: Routledge, 2010 (with D. Ripley).

Refereed Papers/Chapters

- God of the gaps. *Analysis*, forthcoming 2017 (with A. J. Cotnoir).
- Off-topic: a new interpretation of Weak Kleene Logic. *Australasian Journal of Logic*, (13:6) 2016, Article no. 1. [<http://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/issue/view/478>.]
- Do laws deliver gluts? In H. Patrick Glenn and Lionel D. Smith, ed., *Law and the New Logics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199-207, in press.
- There is no logical negation: true, false, both and neither. In P. Girard and Z. Weber, eds., *Non-classicality: Logic, Philosophy, and Mathematics*, a special volume of *Australasian Journal of Logic*, in press.
- Trivializing sentences and the promise of semantic completeness. *Analysis*, 75 (4):573-584 (2015).
- Non-detachable validity and deflationism. In C. Caret and O. Hjortland, ed., *Foundations of Logical Consequence*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 276-285, 2015.
- The end of inclosure. *Mind*, 123 (491):829-849 (2014).
- Tolerance without gluts. *Mind*, 123 (491):791-811 (2014).
- Free of detachment: logic, rationality, and gluts. *Nous*, DOI: 10.1111/nous.12029.
 - * Selected as one of Top-10 Articles in Philosophy for year 2013; reprinted in *The Philosopher's Annual*. <http://www.philosophersannual.org/>.
- A simple approach towards recapturing consistent theories in paraconsistent settings. *Review of Symbolic Logic*, Vo6:No4, December 2013, pp 755-764.

- Two flavors of Curry’s paradox. *Journal of Philosophy*, 110 (3):143-165 (with J. Murzi).
- Shrieking against gluts. *Analysis* (2013) 73 (3):438-445.
- Why Priest’s reassurance is not reassuring. *Analysis* (2012) 72 (3): 517-525.
- LP⁺, K3⁺, FDE⁺ and their classical collapse. *Review Symbolic Logic*, v6n4, 2013.
- A note on freedom from detachment in the Logic of Paradox. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, Volume 54, Number 1 (2013), 15-20. (with T. Forster and J. Seligman).
- Multiple-conclusion LP and default classicality. *Review of Symbolic Logic* v4:n2, 2011.
- Future contradictions. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 90 (3):547-557, 2012.
- Non-classical truth theories. In M. Glanzberg, ed., *Oxford Handbook of Truth*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming (with D. Ripley).
- Adding to relevant restricted quantification. *Australasian Journal of Logic* v10:2011.
- Dialetheists against Pinocchio. *Analysis* 71:4, pp. 689–691.
- Can *u* do that? *Analysis* 71:2, pp. 280–285 (with G. Priest and Z. Weber).
- On the ternary relation and conditionality. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* (2012); 41:595–612 (with R. Brady, J. M. Dunn, A. Hazen, E. Mares, R. K. Meyer, G. Priest, G. Restall, D. Ripley, J. Slaney, R. Sylvan).
- Deflated truth pluralism. In C. Wright and N. Pedersen, eds., *Alethic Pluralism: Current Debates*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
- Strict-choice validities. In D. Cohnitz, P. Pagin and M. Rossberg, *Erkenntnis (Special issue): Monism, Pluralism, Relativism: New Essays on the Status of Logic*, forthcoming.
- True, false, and paranormal. *Analysis* 66:2, pp.102–114. (Selected for *Analysis Preprints*.)
- Vague intensions: a modest marriage proposal. In Moruzzi & Dietz, eds, *Cuts and Clouds: Essays on the Nature and Logic Vagueness*, Oxford: OUP, pp. 187–200.
- Truth, necessity, and abnormal worlds. In M. Pelis, ed., *Logica Yearbook 2009*, College Publications, 2010, pp. 17–33.
- Prolegomenon to future revenge. In Beall, ed., *Revenge of the Liar*, OUP, pp. 1–30.
- Where the paths meet: remarks on truth and paradox. In S. French, ed., *Midwest Studies: Truth*, South Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 2008 (with M. Glanzberg).
- ‘Unsettledness’ in a bivalent language: a modest, non-epistemic proposal. In H. Dyke, ed., *From Truth to Reality: Essays on the Logic and Nature of Truth*, Routledge, 2008.
- Truth and Paradox—A Philosophical Sketch. In D. Jacquette, ed., *Handbook of the Philosophy of Science Volume X: Philosophy of Logic*, Elsevier, 2007, pp. 325–410.
- Modelling the ‘Ordinary View’. In P. Greenough et al., eds., *Truth and Realism: Current Debates*, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 61–74.
- Not deep inconsistency. *Australasian Journal of Logic*, 2007.
- Relevant Restricted Quantification. *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, in press (with R. Brady, A. Hazen, G. Priest, G. Restall).
- Knowability and Odd Epistemic Possibilities. In J. Salerno, ed., *New Essays on Knowability*, Oxford University Press, pp. 105–127.
- Transparent Disquotationalism. In Beall et al., eds., *Deflationism and Paradox*, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.7–22. [NB: This paper was blind- and externally refereed.]

- Minimalism, Epistemicism, and Paradox. In Beall et al., eds., *Deflationism and Paradox*, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.85–96. [NB: blind- and externally refereed.]
- Analetheism and Dialetheism. *Analysis* Jan 2004 (with D. Ripley).
- On the Singularity Theory of Denotation. In Beall, ed., *Liars and Heaps*, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp.53–62. [NB: blind- and externally refereed.]
- True and False—As If. In Priest et al., eds, *The Law of Non-Contradiction*, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.197–216. [NB: blind- and externally refereed.]
- At the Intersection of Truth and Falsity. In G. Priest et al., eds., *The Law of Non-Contradiction*, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.7–19.
- Negation on Holiday: Double-Aspect Dialetheism. In D. DeVidi et al., eds., *A Logical Approach to Philosophy*, Kluwer, pp. 169–92.
- Deflationism and gaps: untying ‘not’s in the debate. *Analysis* (October 62.4 2003).
- Is Yablo’s paradox non-circular? *Analysis* 61:3, July 2001, pp.176–87.
- A neglected deflationary approach to the liar. *Analysis* 61.2, April 2001, pp.129–36.
- Dialetheism and the Probability of Contradictions. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 79:1, March 2001, pp.114–18.
- Existence Claims and Causation. *Philosophia Mathematica* (3), V. 9, 2001, pp.80–6.
- A Neglected Response to The Grim Result. *Analysis* 60:1, January 2000, pp.38–41.
- On the Identity Theory of Truth. *Philosophy* 75:291, January 2000, pp.127–30.
- Is the Observable World Consistent? *AJP* 78:1, 2000, pp.113–118.
- Minimalism, gaps, and the Holton conditional. *Analysis* 60:4, Oct 2000, pp.340–351.
- Fitch’s Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 78:2, June 2000, pp. 241–247.
- On Truthmakers for Negative Truths. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 78:2, June 2000, pp.264–268.
- On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism About Truth Predicates. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 50:200, July 2000, pp. 380–382.
- Completing Sorensen’s Menu: A Non-Modal Yabloesque Curry. *Mind* 108:432, October 1999, pp.737–739.
- From Full Blooded Platonism To Really Full Blooded Platonism. *Philosophia Mathematica* (3) Vol. 7, October 1999, pp.321–25.
- A Priestly Recipe for Explosive Curry. *Logical Studies* 2001, No. 7. (Special Issue: Proceedings of the International Conference Third Smirnov Readings Moscow, 5.24–5.27.01)
- Should Deflationists be Dialetheists? *Noûs* 37:2 2003, pp.303–24 (w/ B. Armour-Garb).
- Further Remarks on Truth and Contradiction. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 52:207, April 2002, pp.217–225.
- Can deflationists be dialetheists? *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 30:6, December 2001, pp.593–608 (with B. Armour-Garb).
- The simple liar without bivalence? *Analysis* 62.1, Jan 2002, pp.22–26 (with O. Bueno).
- Looking for Contradictions. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 79:4, December 2001, pp.565–570 (with M. Colyvan).

- From Heaps of Gluts to Hyde-ing the Sorites. *Mind* 110:438, Apr 2001:401-408 (w/ M. Colyvan).
- Defending Logical Pluralism. In B. Brown and J. Woods, eds., *Logical Consequences*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001 (with G. Restall).
- Logical Pluralism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 78, December 2000, pp.475–93 (with G. Restall). (Selected for the Special 2000 AJP Volume on Logic).

Refereed Encyclopedia and Related Entries

- Logic. In Duncan Pritchard, ed., *Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy* (with John P. Burgess), 2017.
- Curry's paradox. In E. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. [Link: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/curry-paradox/>.]
- Liar paradox. In E. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (with M. Glanzberg). [Link: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/>.]
- Logical consequence. In E. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (with G. Restall). [Link: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-consequence/>.]
- Consistency, truth, and paradox. In P. Hogan, ed., *Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences*.
- Language and logic. In P. Hogan, ed., *Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences*.

Book Reviews

- Review of T. Maudlin, *Truth and Paradox* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), *The Philosophical Review*, forthcoming.
- Review of K. Fine, *Modality and Tense* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, forthcoming.
- Review of W. Künne, *Conceptions of Truth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, forthcoming.
- Review of G. Priest, *Towards Non-Existence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), *Notre Dame Philosophical Review*, forthcoming.
- Review of S. Shapiro, *Handbook of Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2005.
- Review of J. Woods, *Paradox and Paraconsistency* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2003 (with D. Ripley).
- Review of H. Field, *Truth and the Absence of Fact* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 2003.
- Review of C. McGinn, *Logical Properties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 2003.
- Review of R. Sorensen, *Vagueness and Contradiction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2002.
- Review of J. M. Dunn and G. M. Hardegree, *Algebraic Methods in Philosophical Logic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 2002.
- Review of S. Soames, *Understanding Truth* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 2001.

Recent Invited Lectures/Talks

- On contextual truth. The Ohio State University, Mar 2017.
- On FDE as logic. University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), Mar 2017.
- FDE as logic. Colloquium, University of Calgary, Sept 2016
- There is no logical negation. AAL, LaTrobe, Melbourne, June 2016
- There is no logical negation. Invited Metaphysics/Logic talk, CUNY/NYU, Oct 2015
- The spirit is willing but the logic is weak. Keynote, Universal Logic Conference, Istanbul, June 2015.
- The ways of subclassical logic: 5-lecture series. Universal Logic Summer School, Istanbul, June 2015.
- On logic. Public lecture, University of Tasmania, Nov 2014.
- Hegelian conjunction. Technical University, Berlin (Germany), July 2014.
- Four shades of truth. Paderborn University, Paderborn (Germany), July 2014.
- Paradox: ancient and new. Keynote, Pacific APA Session, San Diego, April 2014.
- Living without detachment. Keynote, World Congress Paraconsistency (IV), Kolkata (India), Ap 2014.
- Knower and truth. Philosophy talk, University of Virginia, Jan 2014.
- Truth and paradox: 7-lecture guest series, Paradoxes Seminar, MIT, Sept–Dec 13.
- Knower as spandrel of truth. Keynote, SIFA 3 Conference, Cagliari (Italy), Nov 13.
- It all comes down to truth. St A Undergraduate Philosophy Series, St Andrews, Oct 13.
- Logic and Rationality. Keynote, Logic and Politics Conference, Milan (Italy), Dec 13.
- Logical versus Hegelian contradiction. Keynote, Logic and Contradiction Conference, Berlin (Germany), Dec 13.
- Non-detachment. Keynote, Non-classical logic conference, Ruhr-Universität Bochum (Germany), Dec 13.
- Philosophy and many-valued logic. Guest Lecture, Cuny Graduate Center, Mar 13.
- The end of inclosure. Philosophy Colloquium, University of Alberta (Canada), Jan 13.
- Logic, rationality, and gluts. Keynote, *In Contradiction*, Glasgow University, Dec 12.
- Non-detachment. Keynote, Society for Exact Philosophy, Ohio State University, Oct 12.
- On non-detachment. Consequence and consequences, GAP Conference, University of Konstanz (Germany), Oct 12.
- Classical recapture and detachment. Philosophy Colloquium, Otago University, July 12.
- Logic, choices, and detachment. Sydney Centre for Foundations of Science, June 12.
- Paradoxes and philosophy. Lehigh University, April 12.
- Detachment and logic. NELLC, Yale University, April 12.
- Truth without detachment. Axiomatic vs Semantic Truth, Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy, Mar 12.
- Truth without detachment. CUNY Graduate Center Colloquium, Feb 12.
- Truth without detachment. 5-talk lecture series, *Arché*, University of St Andrews, Jan 12.
- Non-detachable dialetheism. Auckland University, Philosophy Colloquium, August 2011.

- Temporal curry paradox. Beyond the Possible Conference, Melbourne, July 2011.
- Illogical times. Technische Universität Berlin, Conference on Contradiction, June 2011.
- On non-detachable validity. Princeton University, Conference on Truth, April 2011.
- Future contradictions. University of Minnesota, Philosophy Colloquium, Feb 2011.
- Vagueness and gluts. Princeton University, Philosophy Colloquium, Oct 2010.
- Curry paradox. *Arché* at University of St Andrews, FLC Conference, Sep 2010.
- Vagueness and gluts. NIP at Univ. of Aberdeen, Language and Logic Conf., Sep 2010.
- Comments on Sider on fundamentality. UMass reunion conference, Amherst, Dec 2009.
- On paraconsistency. CUNY Grad. Center, NYC, Priest paradox seminar, Dec 2009.
- Actuality and non-normal worlds. University of Auckland, NZ, Aug 2009.
- Normality: an overspill result. Victoria University of Wellington, NZ, July 2009.
- Modal notions and contraction. University of Otago, Dunedin NZ, July 2009.
- Abnormal actuality. Henjice, CZ, *Logica* keynote talk, June 2009.
- Spandrels of truth. Union College, May 2009.
- Truth pluralism. *Arché*, University of St Andrews, Jan 2009.
- Transparent dialetheism. Yale University; Bobzien paradox seminar, 2008.
- On dialetheism. MIT; Ráyo paradox seminar, Nov 2008.
- Validity and truth-preservation. Tartu Estonia; Logical Pluralism conference, 2008.
- Paraconsistency and vagueness. University of Sydney, July 2008.
- Restricted generalizations in BXTT. University of Melbourne, June 2008.
- Vagueness and predicate term negation. MIT; McGee vagueness seminar, Mar 2008.
- Truth and P-sentences: comments on Vann McGee. 41st Chapel Hill Philosophy Colloquium, Chapel Hill NC, 2007.
- Non-epistemic unsettledness and bivalence. ‘Truth and Reality’ at Otago Uni, NZ, 2007.
- Truth and paradox (with M. Glanzberg), Math Methods in Philosophy, Banff Research Center, Banff, 2007.
- Truthmakers. ‘Truthmakers’ session with T. Merricks at Central APA (Chicago), 2006.
- Semantical properties. University of Glasgow, UK, 2006.
- Abnormal worlds. Manchester University, UK, 2006.
- True and Paranormal. University of Pittsburgh, 2005.
- Why paradoxes matter. *Arché*, University of St Andrews, Nov 2005.
- True, False, and Paranormal. University of Notre Dame (Indiana, USA), 2005.
- Truth and Falsity. Colloquia at Smith and Mount Holyoke Colleges (MA, USA), 2005.
- Paradox and Paranormality. University of Richmond (Virginia), 2005.
- On Dialetheism. Philosophy of Mathematics Workshop, UNC Chapel Hill, 2004.
- The ‘Ordinary View’. Truth and Realism Conference, University of St Andrews, 2004.
- Restricted Quantification in Strong Paraconsistency. University of Melbourne, 2003.
- Full-blooded Inconsistency. Yale University, 2003.

- Paraconsistency and Mathematics. Logic Colloquium, University of Buffalo, 2002.

Professional and Administrative Service

- Editor (Subject: Logic): *Philosophy Compass* journal, Oxford: Wiley (2015–).
- Editor (Subject: Logic): *Thought* journal, Oxford: Wiley (2011–2016).
- Coordinator: LP set theory workshop (UCONN, 2013).
- Director of Graduate Studies in Philosophy at UConn (2010–): philosophy.uconn.edu.
- Co-Founder and Director of the UConn Logic Group (2008–): logic.uconn.edu.
- Co-founder of New England Logic and Language Colloquium (2006–).
- Editorial Board (Philosophy of Logic): Routledge Philosophy Compass Series (2005–).
- Coordinator: *Arché* Paradox Workshop (University of St Andrews, 2005).
- Coordinator: Liars and Heaps (University of Connecticut, 2002).
- Co-coordinator: Logical Pluralism Conference (University of Tasmania, 2001).
- Tenure/Promotion Reviews (all external from 2004): eleven.
- Ph.D. director/committee: eight/ten (from 2004–).
- External PhD/MA theses: six/four.
- Regular Referee for: Ashgate Press (Logic Series), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Cambridge University Press, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Philosophical Logic, Journal of Symbolic Logic, Mind, MIT Press, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Noûs, Oxford University Press, Philosophia Mathematica, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Review of Symbolic Logic, Routledge Press, Edinburgh Press (textbook), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Studia Logica.
- Nominating Editor for *The Philosopher's Annual* (2004–): philosophersannual.org/.
- Reviewer for Brian Leiter's 'philosophical gourmet report' general rankings (2001-2015); 'speciality rankings reviewer' (philosophical logic, mathematical logic, 2003– 2015). [No longer involved.]
- Normal administrative duties in the UConn Philosophy Dept and on various UConn-wide committees (e.g., faculty standards committee, a sub-committee of the faculty senate).
- Additional administrative duties in the UConn Philosophy Dept: Melbourne University Collaborative PhD Program coordinator; Global Research Coordinator.
- Additional committee work at UConn: Environmental Studies Advisory Board and Global Programs Faculty Advisory Board; Chair Faculty Standards (University Senate); Chair of Provost's Task Force on Graduate Education; Member of 12-person UCONN Academic Vision Committee.

Teaching

Logic (classical and nonclassical); contemporary analytic philosophy of language, of logic, and of mathematics; epistemology; metaphysics; occasional topics in environmental philosophy and philosophy of religion.

UCONN-specific admin

The full slate of UCONN-specific administrative service is available on request.