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Modelling the ‘Ordinary View’

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Abstract. This paper is a response to Crispin Wright’s attempt to model (what he calls) ‘the ordinary view’ of ‘disputes of inclination’. Familiarity with Wright’s paper (Chapter 2 of this volume) is assumed. I propose and briefly discuss two models that Wright neglects, a (non-relative) paraconsistent model and a version of truth-relativism where truth is correspondence.

I TASTE-FUNCTION RELATIVISM

Consider the following (apparent) dispute:

BRUCE: Vegemite is delicious.

JOEY: Vegemite is not delicious.

I believe that the most natural response to this apparent dispute is to treat it as merely apparent, and indeed invoke some sort of relativism—parameterization—with respect to ‘is delicious’.

The natural response invokes a ‘taste-function’, as it were, which takes some sort of input—say, Vegemite—and yields a value (which we can take to be a natural number). Simple taste-function relativism maintains that each person has such a taste-function, and ‘is delicious’ contains an implicit parameter over taste-functions:

’x is delicious,’ is satisfied exactly if \( t(x) = n \) where \( n \geq m \) for some threshold \( m \).

In turn, assertibility conditions—which are relative to a state of information or, more generally, a state (or agent)—likewise invoke such taste-functions (and some threshold \( m \)):

that Vegemite is delicious, is assertible by an agent \( b \) exactly if \( b \)’s taste-function \( t \) is such that \( t(\text{Vegemite}) = n \) (for \( n \geq m \)).

For useful discussion I thank Patrick Greenough, Michael Lynch, Daniel Nolan, Crispin Wright, and various attendees at the 2004 St. Andrews ‘Truth and Realism’ conference.
As a first go, such taste-function relativism, it seems to me, is a viable approach to ‘disputes of taste’—and ‘disputes of humour’, and so on. No doubt, more needs to be said, but the general idea is clear enough and, it seems to me, fairly plausible. But Crispin Wright (p. 00) objects.

**Objection:** That sort of simple relativism about taste clashes against the challenge implicit in what is otherwise a sensible question, namely: If, as you say, Vegemite is delicious, how come nobody at this conference but you likes it? As Wright (p. 00) points out, such a question—on the proposed (taste-function) relativism—betrays incompetence (a failure to recognize the hidden parameter), but such alleged incompetence seems not to be present in such ordinary questions.

**Reply:** The given challenge (question) needn’t betray incompetence; it can betray a ‘limit sense’ of taste-relative terms. In particular, it may well be that there’s a use of ‘delicious’—an absolute but nonetheless indexed usage—according to which:

\[ x \text{ is delicious}, \ t \] is satisfied exactly if \( t'(x) = n \) (where \( n \geq m \) for some threshold \( m \)) for all ‘accessible’ taste-functions \( t' \), where ‘accessible’ can be cashed out in some standard contextualist fashion.

In a context in which such a ‘limit sense’ of ‘delicious’ is in play—or is taken to be in play by the parties in the conversation—the given question is straightforwardly competent.

For all that Wright has said, I do not see why such simple taste-function relativism isn’t an appropriate account of ‘matters of taste’—or humour or whatnot. But for now, it is best to put Wright’s chief task squarely on the table.

**2 Wright’s Aim: The Ordinary View**

Whether taste-function relativism (or some variant) is ultimately the best approach to ‘disputes of taste’ is in many ways beside Wright’s chief task. Wright’s task, I take it, is not to find the most plausible account of ‘disputes of taste’ but, rather, to find a ‘coherent’ account of the ‘Ordinary View’ of such (apparent) disputes. What Wright calls ‘disputes of inclination’ constitute the target of the ‘Ordinary View’, and whether (apparent) disputes of taste are ultimately disputes of inclination is an open question.

Wright’s main task is to give a plausible account—a plausible model—of the Ordinary View, where the Ordinary View essentially involves four features:

- **Existence:** There are ‘disputes of inclination’.
- **Contradiction:** Such disputes involve genuinely incompatible attitudes (and the conjunction of what the disputants believe is a formal contradiction).
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• **Faultlessness**: Nobody need be mistaken in such disputes.
• **Sustainability**: The antagonists may, perfectly rationally, stick to their respective views even after the disagreement comes to light and impresses (them) as intractable.

Wright’s task, then, is simply cashing out the Ordinary View in a ‘coherent’ fashion—either in a non-parametric or a parametric (relativistic) fashion.¹

The given task is constrained by (what Wright calls) the simple deduction, where \( a \) and \( b \) are agents and, letting context dictate use-mention, \( \neg \psi \) is the negation of \( \psi \):

1. \( a \) accepts \( \psi \) [Assumption]
2. \( b \) accepts \( \neg \psi \) [Assumption]
3. \( a \) and \( b \)’s disagreement involves no mistake [Assumption]
4. \( \psi \) [Assumption]
5. \( b \) is guilty of a mistake [2,4]
6. \( \neg \psi \) [3–5, Reductio]
7. \( a \) is guilty of a mistake [1,6]
8. The negation of (3) is true [3,5,7].

Note that the conclusion of the simple deduction, at least as I understand it, is:

9. Either \( a \) is mistaken or \( b \) is mistaken.

And (9) is supposed to follow directly from (8), which is intended to have the form:

\[ \neg(\neg Ma \wedge \neg Mb) \]

with \( \neg Ma \wedge \neg Mb \) being the (intended) form of (3).²

So understood, the simple deduction seems to bar the Ordinary View from coherent formulation, apparently showing that at least one of the disputants is mistaken, contrary to ‘faultlessness’. The constraint, then, is to block the simple deduction, so that both contradiction and faultlessness may stand up.

Towards cashing out the Ordinary View, Wright proposes two approaches, the first a non-parametric (intuitionistic) approach, the second a parametric one. I briefly comment on each proposal, but my main aim is to propose a few options that Wright neglects.

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¹ Some might think that Wright’s task is thereby the task of cashing out a coherent version of truth-relativism, but Wright maintains that truth-relativism is actually a theoretical attempt to cash out the Ordinary View, and so it is worth exploring non-parametric accounts of the Ordinary View.

² Think of \( M \) as is mistaken (with respect to \( \psi \)).
3 INTUITIONISTIC APPROACH

If the task is to give a coherent model of some view, then one should not prejudge the issue with one’s favoured logical theory. Suppose, for example, that we are trying to give a coherent but accurate model of inconsistent fictions. In that case, a natural first step would not invoke classical logic (or, for that matter, intuitionistic logic) but, rather, some version or other of paraconsistent logic. In the present case—namely, modelling the ‘Ordinary View’—Wright pursues an intuitionistic framework.

Wright’s intuitionistic response blocks the Simple Deduction by blocking the step from (8) to (9): the step from \( \neg(\neg Ma \land \neg Mb) \) to \( Ma \lor Mb \) is intuitionistically invalid. Moreover, the intuitionistic model of the Ordinary View can be motivated in ways that Wright discusses—taking ‘disputes of inclination’ to be situations in which neither party has suitable warrant for claiming that the other’s view is false (or untrue). (See chapter 2 for further discussion.) Another virtue of the approach is that it doesn’t require a truth-relativism or, for that matter, any significant relativism at all. The approach is one that cashes out the Ordinary View as a non-relativistic view—a non-parametric view.

Despite its virtues, the intuitionistic model confronts problems. The proposal’s chief problem, as Wright himself points out, is (in effect) an explanatory one. We want an explanation of how the disputants can be faultless when they believe ‘contradictory’ claims, of how they are ‘faultless’ when they have at least contrary attitudes towards one and the same claim (or proposition, and so on). What is it about such special claims/propositions that affords faultlessness (and sustainability)? The most natural answer invokes absence of ‘mistake-makers’ (if you will)—the absence of any ‘fact of the matter’ that, as it were, would otherwise make a mistake of your belief. The trouble, as Wright points out, is that the intuitionistic proposal cannot take that line, since it cannot make the claim that neither party’s (given) belief is untrue—the claim equivalent to (3) in the simple deduction.³

What would be better is a model of the Ordinary View that not only blocks the simple deduction but also allows for the ‘no fact of the matter’ explanation of faultlessness. That, in the end, is what Wright’s parametric proposal—his ‘true relativism’—attempts to achieve. But before turning to that proposal, I think it’s worth noting a non-parametric option that Wright neglects—a paraconsistent option.

³ Actually, it isn’t clear to me that the intuitionistic line is stuck here. What one needs is some negation-like device that serves—perhaps in concert with intuitionistic negation—to express ‘no fact of the matter’ but for which some step in the ‘simple deduction’ fails (e.g., reductio). I suspect that such a device can be—perhaps has been—constructed, but I will not pursue it here.
4 PARACONSISTENT PROPOSAL(S)

Recall the challenge of Wright’s main task. As he puts it:

The challenge [is] to harmonize the three ingredients—Contradiction, Faultlessness, and Sustainability. And the point hasn’t gone away that if it is insisted that a dispute can be regarded as fault-free only if it’s open to us to suppose that each antagonist has a correct view, then a mere acceptance that the dispute is genuine—so involves contradictory opinions—precludes regarding it as fault-free. Punkt. (p. 00)

Harmonizing the three ingredients, it seems to me, immediately suggests that the most faithful, natural model of the Ordinary View is a paraconsistent one.

Recall the task: namely, to give a coherent model of the Ordinary View, one that ‘harmonizes the three ingredients’. ‘Coherent’ need not mean consistent, as far as I can see; it needs to be non-trivial, but needn’t be entirely consistent. And that is what paraconsistency promises: inconsistent but non-trivial theories.

A distinction is worth drawing: weak paraconsistentists are those who take paraconsistent logics seriously as a means of modelling a particular domain of discourse (e.g., naive semantic theories, etc.); they do not accept that such models reflect genuine possibilities, certainly not actualities. Strong paraconsistentists, on the other hand, are those who believe that such inconsistencies are genuinely possible—that there may well be truths with true negations. (Strong paraconsistentists are often dialetheists, those who think that there’s some truth the negation of which is true.) For present purposes, Wright’s task calls only for weak paraconsistency—merely modelling the Ordinary View in an inconsistent fashion. Towards that end, two approaches immediately suggest themselves. I (very) briefly consider each in turn.⁴

4.1 Simple paraconsistent semantics

For present purposes, we can concentrate on a single (and simple) paraconsistent logic. Let \( V = \{1, 0\} \) comprise our semantic values, and let our ‘designated values’ be \( D = \{1\} \). Concentrating on the propositional level, we take valuations (or interpretations) to be functions from the atomics into \( V \), and then extend such valuations along so-called Strong Kleene lines (table 3.1).

With interpretations in hand, a (semantic) consequence relation \( \models \) is defined in the usual (many-valued) way, where \( \mathcal{A} \) comprises sentences of the language:

⁴ Actually, there are many approaches that suggest themselves, including the Brandom–Rescher approach (References: 9) to inconsistent discourse, as well as the Da Costa C-systems (References: 7), and perhaps especially Batens’ so-called ‘adaptive paraconsistent systems’ (References: 3). And others. See also Brown’s discussion (References: 6).
Table 3.1.

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\[ \mathcal{X} \models A \text{ iff for any interpretation } \nu, \nu(A) \in D \text{ if } \nu(B) \in D \text{ for all } B \text{ in } \mathcal{X}. \]

In turn, valid sentences (or logical truths) may be defined in terms of \( \models \) by saying that \( A \) is valid iff \( \emptyset \models A \).

This is what Priest calls ‘the logic of paradox’ (LP) (References: 8), which is just the ‘gap’-free fragment of Anderson and Belnap’s four-valued semantics (References: 1). (One ‘transforms’ Strong Kleene into LP by designating the third value.)

For present purposes, the pressing question is not so much the logic (which will suffice with respect to blocking the simple deduction) but, rather, the philosophical story—the extent to which the Ordinary View can be ‘coherently formulated’ along such paraconsistent lines.

4.2 Dialetheic Story

One obvious way to get the three ingredients is via a dialetheic model according to which ‘judgements of taste’ are—to use Kit Fine’s term—gluts, that ‘Vegemite is delicious’ and its negation are true. In that case, we have the ingredient of ‘contradiction’ in the sense that conjoining the disputants’ beliefs yields something of the form \( \varphi \land \neg \varphi \), and the disputants take conflicting attitudes towards each of the conjuncts. Moreover, we have a straightforward sense of faultlessness and sustainability: both disputants’ have true beliefs, and so such beliefs may rationally be sustained.

One problem with the dialetheic model is that it, like Wright’s intuitionistic proposal, seems unable to ground faultlessness in the ‘absence of mistake-makers’, in there being ‘no fact of the matter’ with respect to matters of taste (or humour, and so on). After all, if both disputants have true beliefs, then, at least in some minimal sense, there’s a fact of the matter ‘grounding’ such true beliefs—at the very least, that Vegemite is delicious and that it’s not!

The dialetheic model (logic plus philosophical story) improves on Wright’s intuitionistic model. The former, but not the latter, has a straightforward explanation of how ‘beliefs of inclination’ (as it were) can be faultless and, in turn, sustainable: they’re true. (They’re also false on the dialetheic line, but that doesn’t take away from their truth!) But both models, as above, fail to achieve the desired ‘no fact of the matter’ feature of the Ordinary View. While that feature is not
essential to the Ordinary View (at least as Wright defines it), it’s nonetheless a desideratum. On that score, the dialetheic model fails.

4.3 Analtheic Interpretation

If we want to employ LP but also have some sense in which ‘there’s no fact of the matter’ with respect to the given class of claims, then we might want to take a different route. In particular, we could take what has been called an analtheic route (References: 5), where the analtheist thinks that some ‘untrue’ claims—in this case, ones for which there’s no fact of the matter—are properly assertible.

With respect to LP, dialetheists (informally) read the middle value as both true and false. For our analtheic purposes, we can (informally) construe the third value as at least not false—or, if you wish, mistake-maker-free.

The idea, in a nutshell, is just this: some claims—for example, those involved in ‘disputes of inclination’—are such that there’s no fact of the matter, and so such claims are at least not false. On the analtheic model, Ordinary Viewers—those who embrace the Ordinary View—drop the familiar dictum that one ought (rationally) only believe what is true; the Ordinary View’s (analtheic) dictum is:

analtheic dictum: One ought (rationally) only believe what is at least not false.

Combined with the dictum is a constraint on consistency:

default consistency: One ought (rationally) to minimize inconsistent beliefs.⁵

With those two principles, the analtheic model of the Ordinary View has many virtues. Indeed, the virtues of such a paraconsistent account are as many as the desiderata that Wright propounds:

V1 It upholds all three essential features in a straightforward way:

(a) Contradiction: The disputants’ beliefs are ‘in contradiction’ both in the formal sense and in that the disputants have ‘opposing’ attitudes towards one and the same claim.
(b) Faultlessness: There is no fault, since there’s simply no fact of the matter to make for mistakes. The given beliefs are at least not false. (Recall the analtheic dictum.)
(c) Sustainability: Since there’s no fault, there’s nothing blocking sustainability. (Recall the dictum.)

V2 It blocks ‘the simple deduction’ exactly as one would expect: Reductio is invalid over the target class of claims.

⁵ Incidentally, this can—and, when properly filled out, would—be cashed out in terms of what Batens (References: 3) calls an ‘adaptive logic’, a non-monotonic paraconsistent logic. Such adaptive logics provide a clear sense to the idea of ‘minimizing inconsistent beliefs’. 
It gives flat-footed content to the falsity of ‘Rampant Realism’. The Rampant Realist, as Wright construes them, thinks that there is some fact of the matter that ‘makes true’ or ‘makes false’ the ‘claims of inclination’, but there is no such fact, according to the analetheist. What makes such claims assertible is that they are at least not false.

Note that I’m not arguing for analetheism with respect to ‘disputes of inclination’. I’m suggesting only that—given Wright’s task—analetheism is a viable model of the Ordinary View (assuming there is such a view), and also that, at least at first blush, it seems to be superior to the intuitionistic model. But I’ll leave that for further debate. For now, the tentative conclusion is that if we want a non-parametric approach, we ought to pursue a paraconsistent (and, it seems, analethic) option.

The question is: why not explore a parametric option? Wright does just that.

5 TRUE RELATIVISM: SUPERASSERTIBILITY

Given the problem confronting his intuitionistic (non-parametric) model, Wright pursues a relativistic option—‘true relativism’—where the aim is to get relativism about propositional truth. Wright suggests that there’s no hope in getting relativism about propositional truth if truth is construed along ‘robust correspondence’. But that is not the end of the project. If, as Wright suggests, we enjoy a truth pluralism, we can construe truth as something other than correspondence.

Wright suggests that superassertibility is a promising option. While superassertibility is clear enough (just think of Kripke-constructions for intuitionistic logic), I am not entirely clear on the overall proposal. In particular, it isn’t clear how the account—aside from explicitly invoking superassertibility—differs from a simple taste-function relativism that indexes ‘true’ instead of ‘delicious’.

The debate, which I here leave open, will turn on what superassertibility adds to the Ordinary View that a crude taste-function truth relativism doesn’t. For now, a simple taste-function truth relativism would run thus, simply shifting the parameter from ‘is delicious’ to ‘is true’:

That Vegemite is delicious is true, exactly if \( t(\text{Vegemite}) = n \) (for \( n \geq m \), threshold \( m \)), where ‘true’, abbreviates ‘true relative to taste-function \( t \)’.

How, aside from the differences that may arise from the semantics of ‘true’, and ‘superassertibility’, is Wright’s account different from above? The answer isn’t clear, at least not without further details of ‘true relativism’. Wright’s ‘true relativism’ is supposed to afford:

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6 But see §6 of this chapter.
representing [a dispute of inclination] as one in which conflicting claims are each true relative to certain parameters of taste, with truth construed as superassertibility on the basis of a notion of assertibility grounded on the relevant non-cognitive affect. (p. 00)

Again, aside from explicitly invoking superassertibility, such a representation is exactly as the simple taste-function relativism suggests—where the ‘parameter of taste’ is simply a taste-function, and assertibility will be tied to the value of such a function (some of that value, perhaps, being determined in part by ‘non-cognitive affect’).

One place of substantial difference—again, aside from the difference of explicitly invoking superassertibility—might arise with respect to ‘Contradiction’. How does Wright’s ‘true relativist’ achieve ‘Contradiction’? The idea is that the disputants reflect conflicting attitudes towards the same proposition by assigning different priorities—different values—to the ‘consequences of regarding it as correct’ (p. 00). For example, one who understands the assertibility-conditions of ‘Vegemite is delicious’ and who ‘regards it as correct’ will assign high values to practices Down Under (whatever those practices may be), while one who ‘regards it as incorrect’ will assign low values to such practices. But what, now, is ‘regarding as correct’? As far as I can see, it is little more than ‘true relative to a taste-function’—true relative to some (perhaps non-cognitive) assignment of (if you will) ‘taste values’.

If, as I’ve suggested, simple taste-function truth-relativism differs from Wright’s ‘true relativism’ only in that the latter invokes superassertibility, the merits of the two must be measured on the basis of what superassertibility offers over simple (taste-function) truth-relativism. On the surface, superassertibility seems a bit more complicated than the simple (and, indeed, rather crude) truth-relativism tied to a taste-function, but debate will tell whether it affords significant virtues over the simple-minded sort of relativism. For present purposes, I leave that issue open. I shall turn to the idea that Wright dismisses: namely, modelling the Ordinary View via a truth-relativism where truth is propositional, correspondence truth.

6 RELATIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRUTH

If there is an ‘Ordinary View’, presumably it is tied to correspondence inasmuch as ‘ordinary intuitions’—before they’re properly tutored in the glories of disquotationalism—tend towards correspondence. Wright (p. 00) claims that the prospects of achieving relative propositional truth, where truth is robust correspondence, are dim. I suggest that Wright is wrong on that score. I suggest that there is a route towards achieving relativism about propositional correspondence truth, one that—suitably tweaked—respects all ingredients of the Ordinary View.
The Rampant Realist, as the Ordinary Viewers have her, is one who thinks that there are determinate facts about ‘deliciousness’ just as there are with our best scientific facts. Ordinary Viewers reject that there are such facts—at least, they’re not like those facts, the facts that make our thoughts true independently of what we think. But the trouble with Ordinary Viewers is that they also think that thoughts about deliciousness are, in some sense, true—it just depends, a bit, on what we think (or on features of us). The task, as Wright set it out, is to make sense of all this. In the present context, the task is to get relativism about propositional truth but construe truth as ‘robust correspondence’.

6.1 The Polarity View

One way to respect the correspondence intuition is via what I’ve elsewhere called the ‘Polarity View’ (References: 4). Physicists posit all sorts of polarities, and metaphysicians—not that I’m really one of them, I should point out—are sometimes pulled to do the same. The Polarity View is a view of truthmakers; it posits a ‘positive polarity’ and a ‘negative polarity’, and is perhaps best motivated by concerns over ‘negative truthmakers’ (but I shall not dwell on that here).

The Polarity View can be modelled in a simple way, and it will help to have a basic picture.7 Ancestors of the model include van Fraassen’s atomic facts (References: 10), and more recently the situation semantics of Barwise and Perry (References: 2). The model is straightforward. Reality, \( W \), comprises a set of properties and relations, \( R \), as to objects, \( D \), and a set of polarities, \( \mathcal{P} = \{1, 0\} \). Each property \( r_n \in R \) has a degree, which is represented by \( n \) in ‘\( r_n \)’. From these ingredients come atomic facts:

\[
\langle r_n, d_1, \ldots, d_n, i \rangle
\]

where \( r_n \in R \), and \( d_1, \ldots, d_n \in D \), and \( i \in \mathcal{P} \). Intuitively, \( \langle r_n, d_1, \ldots, d_n, 1 \rangle \) is the fact that \( d_1, \ldots, d_n \) are \( r_n \)-related; \( \langle r_n, d_1, \ldots, d_n, 0 \rangle \) is the fact that \( d_1, \ldots, d_n \) are not \( r_n \)-related. \( \langle r_n, d_1, \ldots, d_n, i \rangle \) is a positive fact if and only if \( i = 1 \); otherwise, \( \langle r_n, d_1, \ldots, d_n, i \rangle \) is a negative fact.

From here, we define what it is for statements to be true in reality or false in reality. Suppose that \( P_n \) is an \( n \)-place predicate and \( c_1, \ldots, c_n \) are singular terms. We let \( \delta(P_n) \) be an element of \( R \) and let \( \delta(c_i) \) be in \( D \). Then the sentence \( P_n(c_1, \ldots, c_n) \) is true in reality if and only if reality comprises the following fact:

\[
\langle \delta(P_n), \delta(c_1), \ldots, \delta(c_n), 1 \rangle;
\]

the given sentence is false in reality if and only if reality comprises the following fact:

\[
\langle \delta(P_n), \delta(c_1), \ldots, \delta(c_n), 0 \rangle.
\]

7 I borrow this from earlier work (References: 4).
Once these atomic sentences have truth-values the compound sentences gain truth-values in the usual way. Letting $W |= T$ and $W |= F$ stand for true in reality and false in reality, respectively, we have the familiar clauses:\footnote{The clauses for conjunction are the usual dual ones.}

\begin{align*}
W |= T \neg \varphi & \text{ iff } W |= F \varphi \\
W |= F \neg \varphi & \text{ iff } W |= T \varphi \\
W |= T \varphi \lor \psi & \text{ iff } W |= T \varphi \text{ or } W |= T \psi \\
W |= F \varphi \lor \psi & \text{ iff } W |= F \varphi \text{ and } W |= F \psi
\end{align*}

So goes the formal picture. The informal story is equally straightforward. In short, truth consists in correspondence with truthmakers, where the truthmakers are positive and negative facts.

With truth and facts—or ‘states of the world’—so conceived, we can characterize the Rampant Realist as thinking that all facts are ‘absolutely fixed’ in the sense that the given polarities are fixed independently of us. Truth is simply correspondence to the facts, with truth of negations being true in virtue of negative facts. There’s no call from the Rampant Realists for ‘relative truth’. The call, as above, comes from Ordinary Viewers.

### 6.2 Relatively Positive/Negative States

Ordinary Viewers agree that truth is simply correspondence; however, as Wright suggests, they nonetheless call for a bit of relativity with respect to such (propositional) truth. They can get it, I suggest, by recognizing—for lack of a better term—relatively positive and relatively negative ‘states’ of the world.

The idea, in short, is that the states making ‘claims (propositions) of inclination’ true (false) are themselves relative to (say) taste-functions—or some such function that assigns either a positive or negative polarity to the state. In other words, Ordinary Viewers recognize a proper sub-class of ‘states’—the ones corresponding to ‘claims of inclination’—the polarity of which is relative to taste-functions.

There are various ways of tweaking the polarity story to add such relativity, and the best account will be a matter of future debate (should there be any interest at all)!\footnote{After seeing my initial proposal, which is below, Daniel Nolan and Crispin Wright both suggested alternatives, each carrying potential virtues with respect to modelling the Ordinary View. (Given space considerations, I’ll limit the discussion to just one proposal.)} One route, for example, might be to add new polarities that somehow reflect the requisite relativity. For present purposes, I will add no new polarities but, rather, ‘polarity maps’. The idea runs as follows.

**Revised model of atomics** As before, $W$ (reality) comprises a set $R$ of properties and relations, a set $D$ of objects, and a set $P = \{1, 0\}$ of polarities. The difference
is that we now also add 'polarity maps' that comprise pairs \( \langle t, p \rangle \), where \( t \) is a taste-function and \( p \in \mathcal{P} \). States of the world, then, have the structure:

\[ \langle r_n, d_1, \ldots, d_n, i \rangle \]

where, now, \( i \in \mathcal{P} \) (a polarity) or \( i = \tau \) (a polarity map). When \( i = 1 \) we call the state an \textit{absolutely positive fact}, and similarly an \textit{absolutely negative fact} when \( i = 0 \). When \( i = \tau \), such states are neither positive facts nor negative facts independently of a given taste-function; they are (as it were) 'neutral states' that are (relative) facts—have a polarity—only relative to some taste-function or other.

The difference between Rampant Realists and Ordinary Viewers is that the former acknowledge no polarity maps in 'facts', the latter do. The Rampant Realist thinks that every fact is absolutely positive or absolutely negative; she needn’t be told about ‘taste-functions’ or the like. Ordinary Viewers are different: for some facts, there’s no sense to the question of whether the facts are positive or negative—at least not until you’ve specified a given taste-function. Inasmuch as some such facts are relative (to taste-functions), truth—being correspondence—is similarly relative, but it’s ‘robust correspondence truth’ for all that.

6.3 The Ordinary View

Whether such an account of relative correspondence truth (with respect to propositions) affords the best model of the Ordinary View is something I leave open, but I think it’s fairly clear that the account affords all three ingredients of the Ordinary View in a coherent way:

- \textbf{Contradiction}: both disputants have incompatible beliefs with respect to \textit{the same proposition}.¹⁰
- \textbf{Fautlessness}: so long as disputants aren’t at fault for having their respective taste-functions, fault is hard to press, in general. After all, we have \textit{relative truth}, and each disputant’s belief is true relative to the way the world is (which, again, is in part a function of their individual taste-functions).¹¹
- \textbf{Sustainability}: short of changing their respective taste-functions, there seems to be little challenge against sustainability.

The proposed ‘relative correspondence’ model, I think, is promising. On the other hand, recalling the trouble with Wright’s intuitionistic model and, similarly, the dialetheic model, one might worry about the ‘no fact of the matter’ desideratum. In the current context, all ‘claims of taste’ are true or false,¹² and so

¹⁰ To make the incompatibility ‘really’ plain, stipulate that for no \( \psi \) do we have \( \mathcal{W} \models \top \psi \) and \( \mathcal{W} \models \bot \psi \), thereby making the ‘falsity clauses’ in §6.1 redundant. (This adjustment forces explosion, \textit{ex falso quodlibet}.)

¹¹ Along this vein, the colloquial sense of Wright’s quoted proverb—\textit{de gustibus non est disputandum}—is on target: there’s no accounting for tastes.

¹² Here, I’m assuming that we stipulate as much with respect to \( \models \top \) and \( \models \bot \).
there is a fact of the matter with respect to disputes of inclination. Nonetheless, the desideratum is achieved, or at least duly respected on the current model:

There are no absolutely positive (negative) facts of the matter—only relative facts—with respect to ‘claims of inclination’.

And now the ‘no fact of the matter’ has good sense: Ordinary Viewers accept that there’s a fact of the matter as to whether Vegemite is delicious; it’s just that, according to the Ordinary View (as here modelled), there’s no absolutely positive (negative) fact of the matter.

7 CLOSING REMARKS

Wright set the task of modelling the Ordinary View. I have suggested that if we want to model the view via a non-parametric approach, then a paraconsistent account is probably more natural than Wright’s intuitionistic account. On the other hand, if we want to model the view on a parametric account, there seem to be various options, one of which, as sketched, takes truth to be relative correspondence—where the relativity shows up only with respect to ‘disputes of inclination’. Inasmuch as Ordinary Viewers tend towards correspondence ‘intuitions’, the relative correspondence version is a better overall model than either Wright’s ‘true relativism’ or the crude (taste-function) relativism that I sketched. But, for space-considerations, I leave the matter there.¹³

REFERENCES


¹³ As for the truth of such matters—matters of taste or the like—I’m still inclined towards a simple taste-function relativism that puts an index on terms like ‘delicious’. But that—the truth of the matter—is not the issue on the table, despite what some taste-functions might prefer.


Queries in Chapter 3

Q1. Please provide the caption.